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POLITICS OF THE NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES-WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TWELVE-MILE BILL
KLINE R. SWYGARD*
INTRODUCTION
The politics of fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean resemble a mam-
moth iceberg drifting in the arctic region of that vast sea-only a small
part is visible on the surface, and its force can be seriously underesti-
mated. A complete understanding of fisheries problems in the North
Pacific depends upon comprehension of the essential roles of politics
and administration-their contributions and limitations. The adoption
of any policy, law, agreement or treaty is dependent upon effective
political operations, and the utility of these laws and agreements, if
not their wisdom, is finally dependent upon the manner and success of
their administration, which is also, in varying degrees, political. Un-
fortunately literature on the politics and administration of fisheries has
lagged far behind scientific, legal, or economic publications on fish-
eries.'
The purpose of this paper is to review the historical development of
the federal legislation which established "a contiguous fishing zone
beyond the territorial sea of the United States," popularly known as
the 12-mile bill,2 with particular reference to the interplay of political
Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University. A.B.; Ph.D., University
of Washington.
'When this writer prepared his doctoral dissertation on the halibut and sockeye
salmon treaties and commissions in the late 1940's, literature on the politics and
administration of fisheries was essentially nonexistent. Except for recent studies by
the Food and Agricultural Organization on fisheries administration, these subjects
continue to suffer from neglect. See K. Swygard, The International Halibut and
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Commissions: A Study in International Administration,
1948 (unpublished thesis in University of Washington Library).
"80 Stat. 908 (1966) reads:
An Act to establish a contiguous fishery zone beyond the territorial sea of the
United States.
There is established a fisheries zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the
United States. The United States will exercise the same exclusive rights in
respect to fisheries in the zone as it has in its territorial sea, subject to the
continuation of traditional fishing by foreign states within this zone as may be
recognized by the United States.
Sec. 2. The fisheries zone has as its inner boundary the outer limits of the
territorial sea and as its seaward boundary a line drawn so that each point on
the line is nine nautical miles from the nearest point in the inner boundary.
Sec. 3. Whenever the President determines that a portion of the fisheries
zone conflicts with the territorial waters or fisheries zone of another country,
he may establish a seaward boundary for such portion of the zone in substitution
for the seaward boundary described in section 2.
Sec. 4. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending the jurisdiction of
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forces in order to expose politics and its role in the North Pacific
fisheries.'
I. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH EXTENDED FISHERIES ZONES
The 12-mile bill was not "struck off at a given moment by the mind
and purpose of man." It was the culmination of efforts which date
back at least to 1886 when the United States attempted to regulate
foreign vessels exploiting North Pacific fur seals beyond the territorial
waters of the United States. Following seizure of British sealing ves-
sels in 1886, 1887, and 1888, the United States enacted a law which
sought to extend American jurisdiction throughout the Bering Sea.
The British resisted, and proposed arbitration of the issue; the United
States agreed.' The arbitral tribunal decided in favor of Great Bri-
tain, stating in terse language that "[t]he United States has not any
right of protection or property in the fur seals frequenting the islands
of the United States in the Bering Sea, when such seals are found out-
side the ordinary 3-mile limit."5 At this time political climate for
extension of fisheries jurisdiction was intense; Secretaries of State
Bayard and Blaine, supporting American fur seal interests, personally
participated in the controversy.' Further claims to extend jurisdiction
over the fur seals were rendered unnecessary by the conclusion of a
convention among interested nations.7 The convention established con-
trols under American administration with a joint sharing in the harvest,
and eased, for the moment, political interest in an extended fisheries
zone.
American fear and opposition to the encroachment of Japanese
fishermen emerged in the early 1930's when the Japanese began to
fish the Bering Sea and Bristol Bay for salmon. In 1937 Delegate
the States to the natural resources beneath and in the waters within the fisheries
zone established by this Act or as diminishing their jurisdiction to such
resources beneath and in the waters of the territorial seas of the United States.
'The administrative process of decision-making in various fisheries organiza-
tions is dealt with in this symposium. See Burke, Aspects of International Deci-
sion-Making Processes in Intergovernmental Fishery Comninissions, 43 WASH. L.
REV. 115 (1967).
'For a more complete survey of this controversy, see L. LEONARD, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF FISHERIS 55-82 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Division of International Law, Monograph No. 7, 1944).
11 FUR SEAL ARBITRATION 56 (1893).
'See LEONARD, supra note 4.
'The Convention for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals, July 7, 1911,
37 Stat. 1542, T.S. No. 564. Parties to the Convention were the United States, Great
Britain, Japan and Russia. This was the historic predecessor of the current agree-
ment-Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957,
8 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948-in which Canada replaced Great Britain as a party.
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Dimond of Alaska (then a territory) and Senator Bone of Washington
introduced bills in Congress which, if passed, would have asserted
American property rights in Alaska salmon to the exclusion of the
Japanese." The following year Senator Copeland of New York intro-
duced a bill which claimed American jurisdiction over the Bering Sea
on the ground that this area was not a true continental shelf but a
submerged appendage of the North American Continent.' These bills
failed to pass; in fact, they were not expected to pass being designed to
stimulate concern and action and to set the stage for later enactments.
One may reasonably conclude that the level of political support in and
out of the Congress for extended fisheries jurisdiction was not very
great at this time.
Nevertheless, pressure for extended jurisdiction continued. After
repeated failures in Congress, proponents finally prevailed upon the
State Department and President Truman to issue a proclamation in
1945 which claimed American jurisdiction over off-shore fisheries.' 0
The proclamation called for the establishment of conservation zones
"in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United
States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be
developed and maintained on a substantial scale."' 1 It stated further
that where the United States had or shall exclusively exploit any
fishery, it "shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United
States."' 2 Where the nationals of the United States shared a fishery
with nationals of other states, these states would jointly regulate and
control the fishery with the United States. The United States con-
ceded the right of other states to establish similar conservation zones
off their shores but without prejudice to established American exploi-
tation of these waters.'3
Authority to implement the proclamation was assigned to the Sec-
retaries of State and Interior. This authority was permissive rather
than mandatory. In view of the opposition to the proclamation which
appeared in the State Department, some proponents accurately pre-
dicted that effective implementation would not materialize. In addi-
tion to a lack of enthusiasm in the State Department, opposition
" S. 2679, H.R. 8982, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1937).
' S. 3744, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
"0 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945).
"Id.
' Id.
'ZFor a favorable appraisal of this proclamation, see Allen, Legal Limits of
Coastal Fishery Protection, 21 WAsn. L. Rlv. 1 (1946).
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developed in the Navy which favored maintenance of the territorial
sea limit of 3 miles for security reasons. The Departments of Interior
and State became more reluctant to carry out the terms of the procla-
mation following the issuance of similar proclamations by other states,
particularly those in Latin America where the proclamations were
implemented to the considerable cost and inconvenience of United
States tuna and shrimp fishermen. 4 The Truman Proclamation was
generally forgotten when the Japanese threat to American fisheries was
temporarily halted under occupation policy following the military sur-
render of Japan in 1945. As a part of the general peace settlement, the
United States, Canada, and Japan concluded a fisheries treaty in
1952. " Among its provisions the treaty incorporated the principle of
abstention which was designed to exclude Japanese fishermen from
specified fisheries in the high seas of the North Pacific. Thus, the
substantial political pressures which led to issuance of the proclama-
tion were dissipated by various countervailing forces.
However, political interest in an extended fisheries zone skyrocketed
in the early 1960's when Russian fishermen expanded into the East
Pacific and West Atlantic, first with exploratory vessels, then with
large modern fishing fleets. In 1966, Russian fishermen began to ex-
ploit the fisheries off the coasts of Oregon, Washington and California.
Though Japanese opposition to the abstention principle probably would
have developed in any event,"6 it was certainly stimulated by possible
Russian exploitation of salmon fisheries from which the Japanese are
excluded.
The security of American fisheries was now threatened by two of the
leading fishing states. Renewed demands for activation of the Truman
Proclamation appeared and Congress was bombarded with an unpre-
cedented number of bills which were designed to protect and enhance
the interests of American fisheries industries. Among this legislation
appeared the 12-mile bill which was enacted into law in 1966.17
"The proclamations of Latin American governments generally claimed exclu-
sive ownership, not merely jurisdiction, over fish within extended zones of 200
miles. Furthermore, they did not recognize the principle of prescriptive or historic
rights of foreign fishermen who had traditionally fished these waters.
"International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786.
"The abstention principle "controversy" between the United States and Japan
is dealt with in this Symposium. Compare Johnson, The Japan-United States
Salmon Conflict, 43 WASH. L. Rxv. 1 (1967), with Yamamoto, The Abstention
Principle and Its Relation to the Evolving International Law of the Seas, 43 WASH.
L. REv. 45 (1967).
17 President Johnson signed the hill into law on October 14, 1966; see note 2
supra.
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Political forces have agitated for extension of fishing zones each
time there has been an external threat to American fishing interests. It
has taken 80 years-from the fur seal dispute of 1886 to the 1966 12-
mile bill-to produce legislation extending fishing zones.'
The pace of politics is slow. A study of political forces leading to
passage of the 12-mile bill-pressure groups and politicians-will illu-
minate some important aspects of the politics of the North Pacific
fisheries.
II. TmE POLITICS OF PEssuRE GROUPS
Figures compiled from Bureau of Commercial Fisheries statistics
reveal 49 fishermen's co-operatives in the four Pacific States with a
membership of 8,127. Corresponding figures for the remainder of the
United States are 37 and 2,082.19 These cooperatives are primarily
concerned with collective bargaining, marketing and purchasing. In
1962 fishermen's and fish shore worker's unions numbered 34 on the
West Coast and 30 for all other states.20 In the same year the fisheries
industry was organized into 34 associations in the Pacific area and 84
in other states including 11 national associations. 1 All are associations
of fishermen, vessel owners, wholesale and retail dealers, processors,
and distributors. The national associations are the most active poli-
tically and speak for the great majority of commercial fisheries in-
terests.2 The Department of State is served by a Fishing Industry
Advisory Committee. The greatest number and probably the most
vigorous of the members represent the salmon and tuna fisheries.
Statistics are not available to show the total number of individual
representatives of fisheries organizations who contributed their politi-
cal weight for or against the 12-mile bill. 2 We can, however, provide
'This is certainly not the final act in the drama of fisheries zones. Political
opposition is still manifest; the zone extends too far beyond the territorial sea for
some, but not far enough for others. Nor have all the nations of the world accepted
the principle of extension; some who agree in principle do not accept the 12-mile
delineation.
"Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, List of Fishery Cooperatives in the United
States, 1960-1961, Fisheries Leaflet No. 292, Rev. Aug. 1961.
' Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, List of Fishermen's and Fish Shore Work-
ers' Unions in the United States, Fisheries Leaflet No. 293, Rev. Aug. 1962.
'Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, List of Fishery Associations in the United
States, Fisheries Leaflet No. 254, Rev. Aug. 1962.
'The statistics listed above do not include all fisheries organizations; nor do
they include fishermen who do not participate in any organized group. Nevertheless,
they probably represent most of the larger operations and provide a fairly accurate
picture of fisheries interests and pressure groups.
'However, in a recent study of the fisheries associations responding to a ques-
tionnaire, 33 percent indicated the 12-mile bill would be helpful but only 11 percent
reported inputs in support of the legislation. Twenty-seven percent opposed the bill
19671
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enough data to illustrate the political activity and indicate who were
the protagonists. At hearings on the bill, held May 18-20, 1966, 29
witnesses appeared. Sixteen represented private fishery organizations;
five represented Congress, not including members of the committee;
one witness was a fishing vessel owner; four were from the Depart-
ment of State; and three were from the Bureau of Commercial Fish-
eries and represented primary federal agencies concerned. In addition
statements were submitted by three members of Congress and three
representatives of private fishery organizations.24
This is not a complete list of interested and active parties. Many
others communicated directly with members of Congress and members
of the administration including, less frequently, the President and
Secretary of State.25 Congresswoman Edith Green of Oregon reported
in September, 1966 that she had received five letters from her own dis-
trict, the Portland area, and about 40 from Astoria, one of the principle
fishing communities in Oregon.26 Senator Magnuson of Washington,
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries and one of the sponsors of the 12-mile bill stated, "[t]he thou-
sands of telegrams and letters I have received during the past 24 hours
but less than half reported inputs. Of 19 fishermen's groups responding affirmatively,
78 percent made some effort on behalf of the legislation.
The questionnaire indicates that with regard to the 53 bills relating to fisheries
being considered by the 89th Congress, 65 percent of the total inputs were addressed
to the 12-mile bill, 72 percent of the fishermen's co-ops' inputs and slightly over 50
percent of the fisheries associations'. One fishermen's co-op made 152 efforts against
the bill, nearly double the efforts of all co-ops supporting the bill.
The questionnaire also indicates that fisheries groups made contact with 46
different Congressmen. Senators Magnuson and Bartlett received over 25 percent
of the reported contacts.
The study concluded that "fishery groups per se do not materially influence
decision-making in Congress. The 12-mile bill was generated by Congress itself,
primarily at the insistence of Senators Magnuson and Bartlett." D. R. Moore,
Results of a Mail Questionnaire, Mershon Social Science Program, Ohio State
University, April 1967.
However, some federal officials contend that the fisheries lobby was a significant
influence. They consider the fisheries lobby one of the most effective, especially in
view of the small number of people represented. It should be added that Senators
Bartlett and Magnuson, along with other Congressmen, were motivated by fisheries
interests as well as their long standing interests in fish.
Grouping of witnesses, statements, letters and telegrams (excluding government
agencies) by state of origin, reveals the following representation of regional inter-
ests: Washington (9), Oregon (8), California (6), Alaska (5), Massachusetts (4),
Rhode Island (3), and Florida (1). One statement and three letters or telegrams were
received from officers of national organizations in Washington, D.C., three of them
representing sport fishing interests.
' Fifteen wives of fishermen from the Pacific Northwest descended on Washing-
ton, D.C. in late summer of 1966, providing one of the more colorful demonstrations
of feeling.
' Personal interview
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confirm my convictions of the value of the fishery resources off our
coast... I will personally see that these messages are delivered imme-
diately to the Secretary of State.... ."I Many other members of Con-
gress also received a variety of suggestions, appeals, and demands, the
number correlating closely with their involvement in fisheries.28
Membership in associations and the level of activity for or against
the 12-mile bill, reveal the regional character of fisheries interests.
They also point up the conflict of interests which sometimes arise
between regions. Obviously, interest in ocean fisheries is concentrated
in coastal states, including those abutting the Gulf of Mexico. Wit-
nesses appearing before the Senate subcommittee came from only
seven states, four of these from the West. 9 The preponderance of
representation from the Pacific coast does not accurately reveal the
regional distribution of fishermen. For several decades political ac-
tivity relating to fisheries has been more vigorous in the West than in
other regions2 0 As a result, the West has made major if not pre-
dominant contributions to development of the nation's fisheries through
successful political activity. It is possible that the 12-mile bill would
not have become law, at least when it did, if the political skill and
' Corvallis Gazette-Times, May 14, 1966, at 2, col. 3.
A committee staff member reported that almost 3,000 telegrams were received in
the 24 hours with letters coming over a longer period of time. A Seattle radio
commentator had encouraged listeners to wire Senator Magnuson to express their
sentiments concerning the presence of the Russian fleet. He did not encourage any
particular position. The messages ranged from temperate to vitriolic with a variety
of proposals. Very few of the respondents represented fisheries, but their proposals
generally favored fisheries interests wittingly or not.
' The majority of communications was directed to members of fisheries commit-
tees, with the greater part of the remainder going to Congressmen from fishing
states, particularly those from districts with a fishing industry. No record is avail-
able of the flow of letters to Congressmen from nonfishing states.
' See note 24 mspra. Twenty-three witnesses resided in the four west coast states,
seven in New England, and one in Florida. However, some of these witnesses repre-
sented fisheries interests in more than one state. For example, the Executive Director
of the National Shrimp Congress resided in Florida but represented several states.
' Washington State has probably been the most vigorous of all, in part because
Washington residents hold substantial interests in Alaska, and in part because it is
the only state immediately concerned with the Fraser River system sockeye salmon.
Concern over fisheries has long been at a high level in Alaska also.
It is difficult to ascertain why a greater intensity of political activity developed
in the West than in other regions, especially in view of the fact that neither
Washington nor Oregon are among the top five fish-producing states. Because of the
interplay of forces, cause and effect are not easily differentiated. A complex of con-
tributing factors appears, some of which are subtle, psychological and difficult to
measure. The frontier spirit in the West, the presence of leaders with unusual
abilities in the early years of the fishing industry, the great volume of scientific
fisheries research (the University of Washington established the nation's first school




vigor of fisheries interests in this region had only paralleled that of
other sections of the nation."'
Political activity of individuals and organizations was also directed
at state officials and agencies.32 Some of these appeals were for direct
state action and some for state intervention for or against the 12-mile
bill and other federal programs. States were called upon to join in
the surveillance of the Russian fleet, in part because the federal re-
ports were suspected of minimizing the effect of Russian fishing. States
were also urged to instigate research programs to determine the nature
and extent of certain fisheries and the damage caused to these fish-
eries by the Russians. Oregon and Washington created special ad-
visory committees on foreign fishing with provisions for co-operation
between the two agencies.
III. THE POLITICS OF THE POLITICIANS
In states where fishing is a significant factor in the economy, poli-
ticians in or seeking elective office generally support fisheries inter-
ests,3" especially when a fishery is in some way threatened. This is
especially true when no competing interests are adversely affected by
any program in support of fisheries. The pattern of political activity
will vary among the states as will the intensity of individual effort.
Some Congressmen are recognized as perennial spokesmen for fishing
industries as others are known for their support of cotton, silver, and
"1 From the viewpoint of some, the West has been too successful on occasion.
One of the more striking illustrations is the Truman Proclamation. It is contended
by some fisheries people, especially those in the shrimp and tuna industries, that
this proclamation triggered the rash of proclamations by other nations which have
seriously handicapped them in distant-water fisheries historically exploited by
Americans. Many of these people opposed the 12-mile bill. It has also been argued,
frequently from the Department of State, that the proclamation was a poor way to
change international law. Opposition to the proclamation and its consequent non-
implementation, coupled with more restrictive and implemented proclamations by
other nations, appear to support this argument. See text accompanying notes 11-15
supra.
"Essentially the same people who communicated with federal officials also ap-
pealed to the states. Judging by news reports, the volume of communications with the
federal government was significantly greater than that with the states. This is to be
expected since the Coast Guard and Bureau of Commercial Fisheries possess pri-
mary responsibility for enforcement of fishery law against foreign vessels, and
most of the legislation up for consideration was in Congress. Moreover, generally,
state legislatures were not in session.
'Fisheries are not likely to become a significant issue in national elections,
since the number of votes that fisheries groups can command is relatively small in
elections for state officials and members of Congress. Nevertheless, in a close elec-
tion they might be decisive. Mark Hatfield of Oregon, after winning the Oregon
senatorial election in November 1966, contended that his continuous and vigorous
demands on the federal government regarding Russian fishing activities contri-
buted to his victory.
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automobiles. Some state officials are also known as consistent friends
of the fishing industries. Political method appears to run the usual
gamut from opprobrious to commendable statesmanship.
The posture of politicians in regard to fisheries is influenced by the
presence or absence of competing interests. Traditionally, in the ex-
ploitation of high seas fisheries, conflicts of interest between fishermen
and other groups are rare. In recent years, however, minor disputes
have arisen in relation to off-shore oil exploration and oceanographic
research. At times some fisheries run head-on into the operations of
other industries and politicians are called upon to choose sides or at-
tempt to reconcile the differences of the protagonists.34 State poli-
ticians may occasionally take sides in these disputes, but more often
will attempt to reconcile the interests of the contending parties. In
summary it is most uncommon for politicians to take a positive stand
against fisheries interests. Nor do they lose political support for being
the champion of fisheries causes.
Many politicians responded to the threat of Russian fishing. Some
proposed the establishment of extended fishing zones. Since the pro-
posals for extension were limited in purposes, no other economic in-
terest in the United States stood to lose from the extension. The only
significant opposition to the 12-mile bill came from within the fisheries
industry itself. Initially, representatives of fisheries groups in some
regions proposed an extended zone in excess of 12 miles. Most com-
monly, these proposals called for an extension coterminous with the
Continental Shelf or a fixed distance of 200 miles. Because of strong
opposition to broader extensions from segments of the industry and
from the Departments of State, Defense (Navy), and Interior, many
proponents of wider zones, without surrendering their ultimate ob-
jective in principle, compromised on the 12-mile bill. Fear of defeat
for any bill calling for a broader extension prompted the conclusion
that "half a loaf was better than none."
Once the 12-mile bill was generally accepted as the immediate ob-
jective of proponents for extension, political activity became substan-
tial and vigorous. It should be emphasized, however, that emotions
against the Russians were also aroused for reasons extraneous to fish-
ing. Fisheries representatives on numerous occasions capitalized on
"For example, during the inshore phases of their life cycle, anadromous fish




concerns for security in seeking support for the 12-mile bill." It would
be interesting to know how many votes would have been reversed if
American security had not been a factor. In any event the vote on the
12-mile bill is not a completely accurate measure of the political sup-
port generally available for fisheries.
The major buildup of the Russian fleet off the Pacific States took
place in April of an election year, 1966. In several states candidates
made the Russian presence a campaign issue. As often happens during
the heat of a campaign, the candidates contributed as much to the
excitement of passions as to the enlightenment of the mind. Rules of
international law were often misunderstood or distorted. Statistics on
the size of the Russian fleet, the amounts and species of fish being
taken, the violation of territorial waters, and the depletion of fish
stocks ranged from vague to ridiculous. On the other hand, the volume
of research undertaken by some members of Congressional fisheries
committees was substantial. An inverse correlation appeared between
the amount of research undertaken and the integrity of campaign
speeches, and irresponsibility appeared to be greater at the state than
the federal level.
On a regional basis, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, and the New
England states gave strong support for the 12-mile bill. Data on the
Gulf States is not available. However, since Russian and Japanese
fishermen have not been a substantial threat in the South and since
the shrimp fishery generally opposed extension, political activity was
no doubt less vigorous in this region. Response was probably more
mixed in California than in any other state. Fishing interests in
northern California are engaged in the same activities and experience
problems similar to those in states to the north. However, the tuna
fishery based in San Pedro in southern California is principally con-
cerned with protecting its fishing off foreign shores, particularly off
Latin America. As a consequence of these varied interests, some
California politicians favored an extension greater than 12 miles, some
favored the 12-mile bill, and some opposed any extension. 6
Statements of politicians divided into charges against the Russians,
support for specific programs, warnings of incidental effects of Russian
The Russians had positioned a large fishing fleet in sight of American shores,
allegedly violating territorial waters part of the time. It was both speculated and
charged that the fishing fleet was a cover for more insidious purposes.
" Nevertheless, no one opposed in principle protection against the Russian
"intruder." Governor Edmund G. Brown personally called upon President Johnson
to appeal for protection of United States fisheries.
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fishing, attacks upon federal officials for alleged lethargy and indif-
ference, and demands for a wide range of actions to be immediately
executed.7 Frequent charges were leveled against Russian fishermen
for violation of a high seas salmon fishing limitation; 8 by agreement in
July 1966, the Russians promised not to fish for salmon for at least one
year.
While some politicians were headline hunting, others were moving
more quietly, thoroughly and cautiously to verify facts and to assess
the long range implications of the many proposals advanced for dealing
with the Russian problem. In Oregon, representatives Green, Duncan,
and Wyatt engaged in thorough research and operated with commen-
dable statesmanship. Mrs. Green, for example, obtained numerous
reports and briefings from top fisheries officials and prepared a state-
ment, Russian Fishing-An Overview, which set forth studied an-
swers to questions which had been submitted by constituents. While
others were demanding that the Russian fishermen be driven out of
"American waters," Mrs. Green was one of the first to propose a con-
servation treaty with the Russians. Subsequently she gave her support
' Western governors, meeting in Las Vegas in April 1966, passed a resolution
which called for a "continuous and constant" surveillance of the Russian fleet and
urged "the Congress, the State Department and the Interior Department to take
action to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union to prevent over-utilization
and depletion of the offshore resources." The conference also discussed support for an
expanded fisheries subsidy program, and urged the Federal Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries to accelerate its management program of bottomfish along the Continental
Shelf and to help develop latent marine fisheries. The conference also proposed that
Canada and Mexico be urged to join the United States in a cooperative research
program. Portland Oregonian, Apr. 28, 1966, at 14, col. 1-3. The following month the
California Assembly passed a similar resolution concerning protection and sur-
veillance.
In early June 1966, the Governors of Washington and Oregon announced the ap-
pointment of a joint committee, composed of six representatives from each state,
to serve as "a watchdog group on foreign fishing operations." Corvallis Gazette-
Times, June 3, 1966, at 6, col. 1.
Various politicians issued numerous statements: Rep. Robert B. Duncan of
Oregon: "The impact of the [Russian] unregulated and massive catches, ... if not
terminated, will decimate, if not destroy, the resource." Portland Oregonian, Apr.
20, 1966, at 27, col. 8; Robert Straub, Oregon State Treasurer and candidate for
governor: "Our fishery resource is being plundered by these Russian pirates." Cor-
vallis Gazette-Times, Apr. 18, 1966, at 11, col. 5; Senator Morse of Oregon:
"[The Russians] are using equipment that will irreparably damage the fishing beds."
Portland Oregonian, Apr. 14, 1966, at 1, col. 5; Congressman Wendall Wyatt of
Oregon: "Depletion of the resource by the Soviets would break the back of the
bottom fishing industry in the Pacific Northwest." Corvallis Gazette-Times, Apr.
23, 1966, at 1, col. 8; Governor Hatfield of Oregon: "Flagrant violations of the
nature reported (Russian violations of the 3-mile limit) should be dealt with in the
sternest possible manner." Corvallis Gazette-Times, May 28, 1966, at 1, col. 3.
'Senator Maguuson told the Senate that "Soviet trawlers are4 taking salmon
as well as bottomfish off the coasts of Washington and Oregon." In early September,
President Johnson informed Soviet officials of a complaint by Washington's Gov-
ernor Evans on August 30, 1966, that the Russians were taking salmon in violation
of their agreement. Corvallis Gazette-Times, Sept. 14,1966, at 1, col. 5.
1967]
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to the 12-mile bill after considering its validity under international law
and its relation to broader foreign policy interests.
The approach of state officials and Federal Congressmen to the
President and Departments of State and Interior ranged from polite
to caustic. Indifference and lethargy in the Interior and State Depart-
ments were the most common complaints2
On the positive side state politicians submitted a variety of proposals
and demands for federal action. In April 1966, Senator Magnuson
appealed for immediate hearings on the 12-mile bill, "diplomatic con-
frontation" with the Soviet Union, and "immediate effort by the State
Department toward implementation of the 1958 Geneva Fishery Con-
vention."4 Representative Wyatt suggested implementation of the
1945 Truman Proclamation, and Governor Hatfield presented a four-
point proposal: a 12-mile fishery zone, international agreements on
conservation measures to be set up by the State Department, a fed-
erally financed crash research program on fishing, and discussions
with the Russians on an exchange of scientific data and agreement on
conservation measures. 1
Treatment under this section on The Politics of the Politicians is
illustrative and by no means exhaustive. It reflects the activity of a
limited number of politicians as reported by a limited segment of the
press. It does not appear to be atypical, and does provide an insight
into the political atmosphere which generally prevailed in fishing states.
In the same regions the press generally gave extensive coverage to
Assistant Secretary of State Douglas MacArthur II issued a statement explaining
there was insufficient information about bottom-fish stocks to initiate conservation
measures, evoking "shocked" responses from Senators Morse and Magnuson. Cor-
vallis Gazette-Times, May 12, 1966, at 1, col. 3.
Neither state nor federal fisheries agencies had conducted a research of the
fishery to provide the necessary information. Dayton L. Alverson, Director of BCF
Exploratory-Fishing and Gear-Research Base in a special feature for the Seattle
Times noted the difficulty of evaluating the biological effects of Soviet fishing
because statistical records of their catches are not available. He also observed that
there was inadequate information on the size of the fish stocks on various grounds.
Seattle Times, July 1, 1966, at 7, col. 1. Lack of information is due in part to a
concentration of Russian fishing on some species which had not been extensively
exploited by Americans. Robert Schoning, Director of the Oregon Fish Commission
added: "We simply don't know what's out there. To be precise, we can't tell if a
catch of a million pounds is going to jeopardize our resource or not even make a
dent in it." Portland Oregonian, May 2, 1966, at 12, col. 1. Scientists also warned
that a fishery could be seriously depleted before the necessary investigations could
be carried out.
In early 1967 Representative Wyatt introduced H.R.J. Res. 233 which "authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a survey of coast and fresh water sport
fishing and commercial fishery resources." Over 20 years had elapsed since the last
"full scale study." Corvallis Gazette-Times, Feb. 16, 1967, at 14, col. 8.
" Corvallis Gazette-Times, Apr. 19, 1966, at 3, col. 1.
" Portland Oregonian, May 4, 1966, at 9, col. 3.
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fisheries matters and editorially gave strong support to fisheries groups.
One Oregon paper was about as extreme in its recommendations as
some of the fishermen, proposing United States Navy maneuvers in
and around the Russian fleet, for the purpose of cutting lines and
harassing them in other ways. Many newspapers recommended im-
mediate and effective action to preserve and to protect the American
fisheries which were threatened.
Although the focus of attention was on Russian fishing, the present
and potential threat of Japanese fishermen was not forgotten, par-
ticularly by officials in West Coast States, and was of more immediate
and special concern to Alaskans.42 The Japanese are currently en-
gaged in restricted fishing off Alaska. Pressures are growing in Japan
for removal of these restrictions which were established by treaty with
Canada and the United States. The possibility that Communist China
and the Koreas might also expand their fishing activities eastward
added further impetus to political support for the 12-mile bill.
IV. CONCLUSION
Only a small percentage of bills introduced in Congress runs the long
range of hurdles and obstructions which frustrate efforts for ultimate
transfer of a bill into law. Effective congressional leadership and a
strong lobby are often indispensable. Senator Magnuson is recognized
as one of the most influential members of the Senate. His co-sponsor-
ship of the bill and his key committee chairmanship were important if
not decisive factors. No corresponding drive and influence appeared in
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, although
several members of this committee worked diligently in support of the
bill.4 3
With the passage of the bill, political activity in support of fisheries
"Governor William A. Egan of Alaska asserted in May 1965 that Alaska would
take "drastic steps" if Japan invaded the Bristol Bay red salmon fishery:
This (heavy Japanese fishing) could be truly the beginning of the end for the
Bristol Bay red salmon .... If this happens, it will be a matter of a very few
years when there is no fishery for anyone-including the Japanese .... There are
no steps too strong that the State of Alaska cannot (sic) take if the Japanese
don't ease up on that fishery.
Seattle Times, May 22, 1965, at 26, col. 2.
'The original House bill, H.R. 9531, was ultimately enacted. It corresponde
with S. 2218 with an amendment added. Representative Downing of Virginia whc
introduced H.R. 9531, stated with reference to the wisdom of the bill, "I frankl3
admit that I have not been able to come to a firm decision within my own mind.'
Representative Garmatz of Maryland, Chairman of the Committee on Merchan
Marine and Fisheries, displayed no enthusiasm for the bill, and Representativ




declined abruptly. Progress in negotiations with the Russians and
tentative agreements with them helped to abate the fear and concern
which had prevailed earlier.44 The incidence of pressure for further
protection will no doubt parallel the assessed and feared damage to the
fisheries which results from continued and possibly expanded exploita-
tion by foreign fishermen.
Pressure for wider zones will abate or intensify in relation to the
patterns of international politics. The February 7, 1967 agreement
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is a one-year agreement
without treaty status.45 A longer range and more comprehensive agree-
ment is necessary if fisheries are to be rationally exploited and deple-
tion averted. Future relations with Japan under the 1953 treaty are
uncertain and may become more unstable. The weapons of interna-
tional politics such as higher import duties, boycotts, and termination
of aid, may or may not be used to supplement or substitute for fisheries
agreements and fisheries zones. Manifestly, the 12-mile bill gives
some, but no final resolution, to the distribution of fisheries resources.
"However, Representative Thomas Pelly of Washington did introduce a bill on
May 23, 1967, to amend the law (78 Stat. 194) prohibiting fishing in territorial and
other specified waters by other than United States vessels. This bill, H.R. 10227,
would exclude foreign fishermen from the Continental Shelf.
"See Johnston, New Uses of International Law in the North Pacific, 43 WASH.
L. REV. at 107 n.82, 111 n.93 (1967).
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